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For political and practical reasons, environmental regulations sometimes treat point source polluters,
such as power plants, differently from mobile source polluters, such as vehicles. This paper measures
the extent of this regulatory asymmetry in the case of nitrogen oxides (NOx), the criteria air pollutant
that has proven to be the most recalcitrant in the United States. We find significant differences in marginal
abatement costs across source types with the marginal cost of reducing NOx from cars less than half
of the marginal cost of reducing NOx from power plants. Our findings have important implications
for the efficiency of NOx emissions reductions and, more broadly, the benefits from increasing the
sectoral scope of environmental regulation. We estimate that the costs of achieving the desired emissions
reductions could have been reduced by nearly $2 billion, or 9 percent of program costs, had marginal
abatement costs been equated across source types.
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A basic tenet in microeconomics holds that, if production has been e¢ ciently allocated, marginal
costs should be equalized across producers. Past empirical work has demonstrated that this equiv-
alence does not always hold in practice. For instance, in the presence of market power (Borenstein,
Bushnell and Wolak, 2002), trade restrictions (Pavcnik, 2002) or industry regulation (Olley and
Pakes, 1996), failure to equate marginal costs across producers has resulted in substantial e¢ ciency
losses.
In the context of environmental regulation, the same principle should apply. The ￿goods￿pro-
duced are improvements in environmental quality. In the speci￿c case of emissions regulation, the
￿producers￿are pollution sources capable of reducing their emissions. The equivalence of marginal
emissions abatement costs across sources is a necessary condition for cost-e⁄ective emissions reduc-
tion. The extent to which this e¢ ciency condition will be satis￿ed depends signi￿cantly on how
policy makers design and implement environmental regulations.
Many pollutants are emitted by sources in multiple sectors of the economy. For instance,
any high temperature combustion process emits nitrogen oxides (NOx), so planes, trains, boats,
trucks, tractors, cars, and stationary sources such as power plants are all sources, although they
are currently all subject to di⁄erent NOx emissions standards in the U.S.1 In general, the health
and environmental damages caused by a speci￿c amount of a given pollutant at a given location
at a given point in time are the same regardless of its source. Cost e⁄ective regulation of NOx
emissions should therefore equate the marginal cost of abatement across similarly located sources.
For decades, economists have emphasized the e¢ ciency gains associated with market-based
environmental policies. Indeed, the large-scale shift away from the more traditional, more prescrip-
tive "command-and-control" approaches for regulating stationary point sources of pollution (such
as technology standards) towards market-based approaches (such as cap-and-trade programs) has
largely been justi￿ed on these grounds. A similar transition to market-based policy instruments
has not occurred for mobile sources such as passenger vehicles. While there has been considerable
attention paid to analyzing how much more e¢ ciently market-based programs coordinate pollution
abatement across point sources subject to the same environmental regulatory program,2 far less
work has been done to evaluate how e¢ ciently abatement activity is coordinated across regulatory
programs and sectors. This paper aims to ￿ll that gap.
1Nitrogen oxides (NOx) are binary compounds composed of oxygen and nitrogen. The most important forms of
NOx in the atmosphere are nitrogen monoxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2).
2Detailed analyses of the e¢ ciency of the Acid Rain Program include Stavins (1998), Keohane (2005) and Shad-
begian et al. (2006). Fowlie (2008) looks at the NOx Budget Program.2
We measure the di⁄erence between the marginal cost of abating NOx emissions from power
plants and the marginal cost of abating NOx emissions from passenger vehicles and calculate the
resulting ine¢ ciencies.3 Our estimates suggest that the e¢ ciency gains from symmetric regulatory
treatment across sectors are most likely larger (in dollar terms) than past estimates of gains from
switching from command and control to market-based approaches. So, while there are large gains
from replacing command-and-control policies with more market-based approaches, debates about
the sectoral scope of a program may be equally important. These results are particularly relevant
to the increasing public discourse about mechanisms for regulating greenhouse gas emissions, which
are emitted by many sectors of the economy.4
There are several reasons why we might observe di⁄erential regulatory treatment of di⁄erent
pollution sources in practice. Positive political economy theories of regulation such as Stigler
(1971) suggest that regulations that impose costs on a small, well organized and politically powerful
interest group and for which the bene￿ts are di⁄use are less likely to be adopted than regulations
for which the costs are di⁄use and the bene￿ts concentrated. While the bene￿ts of reducing
NOx may be roughly the same regardless of which source is regulated, costly standards are less
likely to apply to politically powerful ￿rms. In the United States, the automobile manufacturers
are much more concentrated than the electricity generators, so organizing to oppose regulations
of their emissions may be easier for vehicle manufacturers as compared to electric generators.
From a downstream perspective, vehicles are for the most part purchased by potential voters,
whereas electricity is purchased by both voters (residential customers) and nonvoters (commercial
and industrial consumers).
From a practical or political transaction costs perspective, the costs associated with implement-
ing regulations may vary. For instance, boats and airplanes are governed by international laws, so
in order for the U.S. to implement NOx standards for these, they would need to coordinate with
other countries. By contrast, power plants fall squarely within the jurisdiction of state and federal
environmental regulators.
We aim to measure the extent to which current U.S. environmental policy deviates from the
theoretical optimum by comparing the marginal costs of abating NOx emissions from power plants
to the marginal cost of abating NOx emissions from passenger vehicles. Speci￿cally, we compare the
cost of reducing NOx under the Federal Tier 2 passenger vehicle emissions reduction program to the
3We will assume that average bene￿ts per ton of NOx reductions achieved under a program that regulates passenger
vehicles and a program that regulates industrial point sources in the United States are similar. Section 6 summarizes
past research and empirical evidence in support of this assumption.
4The costs of U.S. policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions may be at least as high as the costs of all other
environmental policies combined (Aldy and Pizer, 2008), so steps to minimizes costs will yield large e¢ ciency gains.3
cost of reducing NOx at power plants subject to the NOx Budget Program. Both programs were
promulgated in 2004, pursuant to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA). Both programs
represent incremental steps taken to increase the stringency of the NOx regulations for mobile and
industrial point sources, respectively.
We construct estimates of NOx marginal abatement costs for power plants using detailed unit-
level engineering data and compare them to estimates for light duty car and truck NOx abatement
costs based on engineering analyses performed for the regulatory impact analysis of Tier 2. Our
estimates of the marginal abatement costs for point sources are more than double those of mobile
sources.
A core strength of this paper is that the engineering data allow us to calculate not only the
marginal cost of pollution abatement that corresponds with the level of NOx reductions mandated
by the existing regulations we observe, but also the costs of abatement options that provide too little
or too much reduction (i.e. were infra- or extra-marginal). Put di⁄erently, because we estimate
marginal abatement cost curves (versus individual points along these curves) we are able to estimate
the e¢ ciency losses from the current policy approach to regulating NOx emissions.
We ￿nd there is considerable scope for e¢ ciency gains. Our preferred estimates of marginal
abatement costs suggest that ine¢ ciencies amount to $1.7 billion, or nine percent of the total
costs incurred to comply with both programs. To put these ￿ndings in perspective, the gains from
coordinating abatement costs within the critically acclaimed Acid Rain Program are estimated to
be $94 million, or 17 percent of total compliance costs (Shadbegian et al., 2006). Although the
cost ine¢ ciencies we estimate are somewhat lower in percentage terms, the e¢ ciency gains in dollar
terms are signi￿cantly higher. Our results highlight the importance of increasing the sectoral-scope
of cap-and-trade programs, which is often met with considerable resistance. For example, the
current framework for California￿ s GHG cap-and-trade program separates transportation from the
other GHG emitting sectors of the economy.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the NOx Budget Program and
the Tier 2 vehicle emissions reduction programs. Section 3 describes generically how we will use
estimates of the marginal abatement cost curves to measure e¢ ciency losses. Section 4 presents the
main results of the paper. We ￿rst explain how we construct the marginal abatement cost curves
for both power plants and for vehicles, and then presents our results. Section 5 discusses ancillary
information we have collected to buttress the engineering cost estimates we use to construct the
marginal abatement curves. As the results in Section 4 assume that the marginal damages of NOx
emissions do not vary by source or geographic location, Section 6 discusses the existing evidence4
on this assumption, which generally seems to support it. Section 7 discusses several additional
programs aimed at reducing NOx, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Regulating Nitrogen Oxide Emissions
Nitrogen oxides (NOx) contain nitrogen and oxygen in varying amounts. NOx form when fuels
are burned at high temperatures. In 2002, just before the programs we study were implemented,
motorized passenger vehicles and electricity generation were responsible for nearly 18 percent and
23 percent, respectively, of man-made NOx emissions. Additional NOx emitters include other
motorized vehicles and industrial sources (see Figure 1).
NOx is the only criteria pollutant for which nationwide emissions have actually increased since
the passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act.5 NOx emissions cause environmental and health damages
through a number of channels. First, NOx reacts with volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the
presence of sunlight to form tropospheric ozone. Exposure to elevated ambient ozone concentrations
has been linked to increased hospitalization for respiratory ailments, irreversible reductions in lung
capacity, and ecological damages (Grypares, 2004; WHO, 2003).6 Second, NOx emissions can react
with other compounds in the atmosphere to form nitrate particulate matter (PM). Studies have
found that exposure to ￿ne particulates is correlated with increased infant mortality (Chay and
Greenstone, 2003) and with increased adult mortality from respiratory or cardiopulmonary disease
(Lippman and Schlessinger, 2000). NOx emissions also contribute to a range of other health and
environmental problems, including acid deposition and nutrient loading in waterways.
2.1 Reducing NOx emissions from point sources
The 1990 CAAA placed unprecedented emphasis on reducing NOx emissions and bringing urban
areas into compliance with federal ozone standards. The Amendments established thoroughly
revised NOx emissions standards for existing point sources in non-attainment areas and all new
sources.7 Because it was anticipated that these measures would be insu¢ cient to bring the north-
eastern region of the United States into attainment with federal ozone standards, the Amendments
5Criteria air pollutants are the only air pollutants for which the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency has established national air quality standards de￿ning allowable ambient air concentrations. Congress
has focused regulatory attention on these pollutants (i.e. carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, particulate
matter, and sulfur dioxide) because they endanger public health and they are widespread throughout the U.S.
6The impacts of ozone on mortality have been di¢ cult to establish, possibly because it is di¢ cult to separate
deaths from ozone exposure from deaths associated with heat.
7Prior to the 1990 Amendments, existing sources of NOx faced little, if any, binding regulation.5
also established the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) to assess the degree of ozone transport
in the northeast and to recommend strategies to mitigate regional ozone problems.
Using detailed models of ozone formation and transport, the OTC demonstrated the regional
nature of the ozone transport problem and identi￿ed the need for signi￿cant reductions in NOx
emissions across the eastern U.S. (OTAG, 1997; U.S. EPA, 1997). The NOx Budget Program,
o¢ cially upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals in 2000, was designed to facilitate cost e⁄ective
reductions of NOx emissions from large stationary sources in 19 eastern states.
The NOx Budget Program (NBP) caps NOx emissions from over 2,500 point sources. Tradable
NOx emissions permits are allocated to these polluting facilities. Because ozone is only a problem
during the warm summer months, the NBP is only in e⁄ect during ￿ozone season￿ (i.e., May
through September). To remain in compliance with the program, a⁄ected point sources must hold
permits equal to their ozone season NOx emissions. All facilities were required to comply beginning
in May 2004.
2.2 Reducing NOx emissions from mobile sources
For mobile sources, the 1990 CAAA introduced new ￿Tier 1￿ standards (measured in grams of
NOx per mile) that tightened pre-existing standards by 40 percent and 50 percent for cars and
light trucks, respectively. The Amendments further required that the EPA continue to assess the
merits, cost-e⁄ectiveness, and feasibility of tighter emission standards for the 2004 model year and
beyond. The National Low Emission Vehicle program (NLEV), which was passed in 1998 and
adopted nationwide in 2001, further reduced NOx emissions by 50 percent and 19 percent for cars
and light trucks, respectively.
In December 1999, the U.S. EPA signed the ￿Tier 2￿ standard which further increased the
stringency of exhaust emission standards for new passenger cars and light-duty vehicles.8 The Tier
2 NOx emissions standard of 0.07 grams per mile (gpm) represented a 77 percent reduction for cars
and a 65-95 percent reduction for trucks. These standards were phased in beginning in 2004.
3 Measuring E¢ ciency from Regulatory Coordination
If the value of the health and environmental bene￿ts associated with reducing NOx emissions at
point sources is equal, per ton of emissions reductions, to the value of reducing vehicular NOx
8The program also established a new maximum sulfur level in gasoline.6
emissions, economic e¢ ciency would dictate that marginal abatement costs should be set equal
across the two sectors. Speci￿cally, let p and m denote point and mobile sources, respectively.
Let the level of emissions reductions required by regulations of source type s 2 fp;mg be ￿ Rs. The
function MACs(Rs) speci￿es the marginal cost of abating NOx emissions among sources of type s
by Rs.
Figure 2 illustrates a case where MACx(Rx) < MACy(Ry); x 6= y: The economic ine¢ ciency
resulting from a lack of regulatory program coordination is represented by area B minus area A.








where ￿R is de￿ned such that:
MACx( ￿ Rx + ￿R) = MACy( ￿ Ry ￿ ￿R):
To measure L, we ￿rst construct estimates of the functions MACp(Rp) and MACm(Rm):
We then identify the levels of emissions reductions ￿ Rp and ￿ Rm that correspond to the con-
straints imposed by the NBP and Tier 2 standards, respectively. Upon ￿nding that MACp( ￿ Rp) >
MACm( ￿ Rm), we de￿ne x = m and y = p and estimate (1).
When estimating (1), we are taking the level of mandated NOx reductions as given. Put
di⁄erently, we are implicitly assuming that the mandated level of emissions reduction is either
the socially optimal or the maximum politically achievable level of reductions. An evaluation of
the e¢ ciency of observed levels of regulatory stringency would require estimating both marginal
abatement cost curves and marginal damage curves. Estimating the damages associated with
di⁄erent levels of NOx concentrations is both complex and controversial (Muller and Mendelsohn,
2008). Consequently, we do not take on this calculation.
4 Results
4.1 Constructing a marginal abatement cost curve for power plants
We estimate NOx abatement costs for 632 coal-￿red generating units in the NBP. Although gas-
and oil-￿red generators and other industrial point sources are also included in the NBP, these 6327
coal-￿red units represent over 90 percent of the NOx emissions regulated under the program.9 The
U.S. EPA reports that coal-￿red electricity generators account for almost all (over 98 percent) of
the NOx emissions reductions achieved under the NBP (U.S. EPA, 2005).
We assume that reductions in NOx emissions from these units are achieved through pollution
control technology retro￿ts and combustion modi￿cations. We do not consider plant retirement or
reduced unit utilization rates as compliance options. As the data suggest that ￿rms did not pursue
those options, we assume that they are less cost e⁄ective than technology retro￿ts.10
Coal plant managers had a variety of NOx control technologies to choose from when they were
deciding how to comply with the NBP. The capital costs, variable operating costs and emissions
reduction e¢ ciencies associated with di⁄erent pollution control technologies vary signi￿cantly, both
across NOx technology types and across generating units with di⁄erent technical characteristics.
Also, not all control technologies are compatible with all boiler types.
We generate unit-speci￿c engineering estimates of technology installation and operating costs
using detailed unit- and plant-level data. In the late 1990s, to help generators prepare to comply
with market-based NOx regulations, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)11 developed
a software program to generate cost estimates for all major NOx control options, conditional on
unit- and plant-level characteristics.12 Cost calculations require detailed data on over 60 unit- and
plant-level operating characteristics, fuel inputs, boiler speci￿cations, plant operating costs, etc.
Appendix A includes a detailed description of the data. Post-retro￿t emissions rates are estimated
using the EPRI software, together with EPA￿ s Integrated Planning Model (U.S. EPA 2003).
We use the EPRI software to ￿rst identify which NOx control technologies are compatible with
each boiler, and then to generate cost estimates for each unit, for each viable control technology.
Let j = 1:::Jn index the NOx control technology options available to the nth electricity generating
unit. Let Knj represent the engineering cost estimates of required capital investments speci￿c to
unit n and technology j; vnj is the corresponding variable operating cost estimate (per kWh) and
enj represents the corresponding post-retro￿t emissions rate. Let en0 represent the pre-retro￿t
9Our analysis focuses exclusively on coal-￿red plants due to data availability constraints. The unit-level cost data
required to carry out this analysis are not available for gas- and oil-￿red generators.
10EPA modeling exercises predicted that less than 0.3 percent of capacity would be prematurely retired as a result
of this program (US EPA, 1998). To date, no program-related retirements have been reported. Because coal-￿red
generation tends to serve load on an around-the-clock basis, we assume that the utilization rates of these coal plants
will not be signi￿cantly a⁄ected by this regulation. Fowlie (2008) ￿nds empirical support for this assumption.
11EPRI is an organization that was created and is funded by public and private electric utilities to conduct electricity
related R&D.
12Anecdotal evidence suggests that this software has been used not only by plant managers, but also by regulators
to evaluate proposed compliance costs for the utilities they regulate (Himes, Musatti, Srivastra).8
emissions rate; this is the amount of NOx the nth unit emits per kWh of electricity generated if
it installs no new pollution controls. For each unit, for each compliance option, we calculate the
net present value (NPV) of estimated pollution control costs cnj and emissions reductions Rnj as
follows:









(1 + r)t :
We assume that generating units are retired at 65 years, so Tn is set equal to 65 minus the
nth unit￿ s age in 2000.13 Historic electricity production during the ozone season, Qn, is used to
proxy for expected ozone season production. To facilitate cost comparisons across point-source and
mobile-source emissions reduction cost estimates, we set r = 0:07.14
The second and third columns of Table 1 present engineering estimates of the NPV costs c and
NPV emissions reductions R associated with the technology options available to a 510 MW unit in
our data set with Tn = 31. These options are listed in order of increasing Rj: This particular unit,
which is representative of other units in the dataset, has nine compliance options. At one extreme,
if the ￿rm relies entirely on the permit market for compliance, c0 = R0 = 0: At the other extreme,
the ￿rm makes a large capital investment in pollution control equipment and reduces emissions by
over 19,000 tons.
We assume that the manager of unit n chooses the compliance option that minimizes the NPV










; j 2 f0;:::;Jng; (2)
where the second argument in parentheses re￿ ects the cost of permits which the units must hold to
o⁄set any uncontrolled emissions and j = 0 identi￿es the option that involves a complete reliance
on the permit market for compliance. Let j￿
n identify the investment choice of the nth ￿rm:
j￿
n 2 f0:::Jng: The pollution permit price ￿ and the vector of investment decisions j￿ = (j￿
1;:::; j￿
N)
describe the equilibrium for the permit market if for each n = 1:::N; j￿
n solves [2] subject to the
13Note that we are not attributing any cost to NOx reductions from the new plants replacing these units once they
retire. This is consistent with the assumption that if new plants comply with new source standards, the cap will
cease to bind as new plants make up a larger share of the ￿ eet.





n ￿ Qn ￿ ￿ E.15
Figure 3 plots the average cost
cnj
Rnj as a function of Rnj for the representative unit summarized
in Table 1. Note that several of the available compliance options will not be cost minimizing at any
permit price. For example, with an average cost of $0.50/lb reduced, option 2 will never be chosen
because option 3, which delivers greater emissions reductions, is associated with a lower average
cost of $0.36/lb. Assuming compliance cost minimizing behavior, options 1;2;4; and 5 will never
be chosen by this unit.
Let J0
n represent the subset of Jn: 8 j0
n 2 J0
n there exists a permit price ￿ such that j0
n is
the compliance cost minimizing choice. Any compliance choice that is not included in J0
n will not
be chosen by a compliance cost minimizing plant manager. In the example depicted in Figure 3,
J0 = f0;3;6;7;8g: These compliance options appear in bold face in Table 1.
We calculate unit- and choice-speci￿c marginal abatement costs macnj0 for all n, for all j0
n 2 J0
n,





The numerator represents the additional costs incurred from choosing the next cleanest option
in J0
n. The denominator represents the additional emissions reductions achieved. Note that the
compliance cost minimizing choice for the nth unit is j0
n if macnj0 < ￿ < macnj0+1. The ￿nal column
of Table 1 reports marginal abatement costs for the relevant compliance alternatives available to
this particular unit.
Our aggregate marginal abatement cost curve re￿ ects the horizontal summation of the unit-
speci￿c marginal abatement cost curves. Speci￿cally, we construct an aggregate marginal abatement
cost curve by using a model of the NBP pollution permit market mechanism that coordinates the
unit-level environmental compliance decisions. We simulate pollution permit market clearing for




en0 ￿ Qn: In this benchmark case, the equilibrium permit price is ￿ = $0 and j￿ = j0 8 n:
The cap is then incrementally decreased to ￿ E1 = ￿ E0 ￿ ": A permit price of $0 o⁄ers no incentive
to invest in pollution control equipment. A strictly positive permit price is required to deliver




n ￿ Qn ￿ ￿ E1: The permit
15This assumes intertemporal arbitrage in the permit market, competitive permit and product markets, certainty
about future abatement costs, and no intertemporal restrictions on permit banking and borrowing.10
price is then incrementally increased until the vector of equilibrium choices j￿ with a corresponding
vector of equilibrium emissions enj￿ satis￿es the constraint imposed by ￿ E1: This entire process is
repeated R times. At each iteration, we make the cap incrementally more stringent and solve for
the constrained equilibrium price. The resulting f ￿ Er;￿rg pairs can be used to trace out a marginal
abatement cost curve for this group of facilities.
Figure 4 plots aggregate abatement ( ￿ E0 ￿ ￿ Er) versus equilibrium permit price ￿r for R = 2000
and " = 1. For each level of ￿ E, the corresponding permit price represents the minimum ￿ required
to induce su¢ cient abatement among this group of point sources such that aggregate emissions
equal ￿ E. The vertical line corresponds to the cap imposed by the NBP. R￿
p is set equal to the
discounted emissions reductions associated with the technology adoption decisions that these units
actually made.16 The equilibrium permit price ￿(R￿
p) that corresponds to these choices (and the
corresponding emissions reductions) is $1920 per ton.17
4.2 Constructing a marginal abatement cost curve for mobile sources
To construct the marginal abatement cost curve for passenger vehicles, we rely on the Tier 2
Regulatory Impact Analysis performed by the EPA (U.S. EPA, 1999a).18 As part of the regulatory
process, the EPA forecast total NOx savings and the costs associated with these savings; we discuss
each of these in this section.
The costs associated with compliance can be split into increases in vehicles costs, ￿xed costs
associated with engineering, and ￿xed costs associated with certi￿cation. While we refer the reader
to the EPA￿ s analysis for all of the particulars, we highlight the important assumptions regarding
consumer purchasing behavior and vehicle-level cost of compliance.
As with point sources, there are a variety of ways auto manufacturers can alter vehicles to
comply with the new legislation. The least cost method for complying is likely to vary by both a
vehicle￿ s size and type of engine. To account for this, the EPA calculates estimates of the least cost
16Information about which compliance strategies were chosen by coal plant managers was obtained from the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, the Energy Information Administration, the Institute for Clean Air Companies and
M.J. Bradley and Associates. These choices imply discounted NOx emissions reductions of 6.7 million tons. An
alternative approach to de￿ning the ￿observed￿cap would involve computing the discounted sum of the mandated
annual emissions caps going forward. This is complicated by the fact that the regulation only de￿nes caps for the
￿rst few years of the program.
17We compare our estimates to realized permit prices in section 5.1.
18Executive Order 12866 requires the US Environmental Protection Agency to provide the O¢ ce of Management
and Budget with detailed Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) for all new ￿economically signi￿cant￿ regulatory
proposals. A proposal is deemed to be economically signi￿cant if annual costs are expected to exceed $100M. Both
Tier 2 and the NBP fall into this category.11
method of compliance separately for each vehicle class/number of cylinder combination.19 The per
vehicle cost estimates are reported in Table 2.20
After calculating the incremental engineering costs for each vehicle type, the EPA makes two
assumptions in the process of transforming the variable costs to marginal abatement costs. First,
the incremental costs are increased by 26 percent to account for ￿overhead and pro￿ts.￿Below we
present results that use the EPA￿ s assumed markup and results that assume a markup of zero.
We take the estimates without the markups as the most accurate estimate of the marginal cost of
abatement, as any markup represents a transfer, rather than a true economic costs. The relevant
cost for e¢ ciency calculations is the marginal social cost of abatement, not the marginal cost of
abatement faced by consumers. Note that if consumers face a higher vehicle price because of higher
markups, there will be some welfare loss to the extent there are fewer vehicles sold. In our context,
this amounts to the markup over a cost that is already small relative to the overall vehicle price,
so we assume that those welfare losses are trivial.
The EPA also assumes that manufacturers experience learning over the course of Tier 2, begin-
ning in the third year of implementation. Speci￿cally, they assume that each time output doubles
a manufacturer experiences a 20 percent reduction in incremental vehicle costs. If their assumed
learning rate is either too large or too small, this assumption will tend to under- or overstate the
marginal cost of abatement for mobile sources.
In addition to vehicle equipment costs, the EPA estimates quasi-￿xed costs associated with
Tier 2. These costs include R&D, tooling and certi￿cation costs. R&D costs are assumed to be $5
million per vehicle line (100,000 vehicles), tooling costs are assumed to be $2 million per vehicle
line and certi￿cation costs are assumed to be $15 million industry wide.21 When calculating the
discounted value of costs, the EPA assumes that ￿xed costs are spread evenly over the ￿rst ￿ve
years. The e⁄ects of learning and ￿xed costs can be seen by examining vehicles costs over time.
Table 3 reports vehicle costs, by vehicle type, in years one, three and six. Costs from year one
to year three fall by between $5 and $34 because of learning. Costs fall signi￿cantly in year six
because ￿xed costs expire.
Combined, the assumptions on variable and ￿xed costs, markups and learning yield vehicle
19There are a number of changes that can be made to autos to reduce NOx; changes to the catalytic converter
system are likely to be most important. Other areas that manufacturers can alter include: improvements to the fuel
injection system, secondary air injection, insulating the exhaust system, engine combustion chamber improvements
and exhaust gas recirculation.
20The NBP calculations are in $2000s, while the Tier 2 calculations are in $1997s. However, according to the BLS
PPI calculations, there was no change in the PPI over the intervening years.
21The EPA has attempted to estimate these costs as incremental ￿xed costs; that is, those additional ￿xed costs
associated with Tier 2. In each case, however, they suggest that they have erred on the side of overstating these costs.12
costs that vary by vehicle type/engine type and year. Table 3 reports the sales weighted average of
these costs by vehicle type and year. A ￿nal requirement needed to generate estimates of the total
discounted costs associated with Tier 2 is a model of consumer vehicle purchase behavior. For this,
the EPA relies on a model of driving and purchasing behavior known as MOBILE5.22 The vehicle
cost and sales data imply total annual costs beginning at $269 million, when Tier 2 is being phased
in, and peaking at $1579 million in 2009; annual costs begin to fall after 2009 because of learning.
The EPA uses the cost estimates associated with Tier 2 to calculate an average cost of the
proposed NOx reductions; this requires an estimate of the total NOx saved under Tier 2. The
amount of NOx saved under Tier 2 will depend on both driving habits and the stock of vehicles in
each year. Driving habits come from the MOBILE6 model, while the EPA uses NHTSA survivor
rates for each vehicle. This generates annual emissions for the assumed stock of vehicles, which is
then summed using a seven percent discount rate.23 Under these assumptions and the standard
EPA assumption when dealing with mobile sources that treats NOx and non-methane hydrocarbons
as the same, the EPA forecasts a lifetime discounted reductions for NOx+NMHC to be 23.5 million
tons. Table 4 reports savings throughout the lifetime of the program; savings increase over time as
more and more Tier 2 vehicles are on the road.
Calculating the marginal abatement cost for the regulatory program is complicated by the fact
that Tier 2 also yields reductions in other pollutants, most notably sulfur and particulate matter.
There are three potential ways to deal with this. One, and probably least accurate, is to simply
ignore them; we refer to this strategy as the ￿uncredited MAC.￿A second is to assign a value for
these other pollutant reductions and reduce the costs associated with Tier 2 by this amount; this
is strategy taken by the EPA and we refer to this strategy as the ￿credited MAC.￿To do this,
the EPA forecasts the amount of each pollutant saved and credits the costs associated with Tier
2; they assume marginal damages of $4,800/ton and $10,000/ton for sulfur and particulate matter,
respectively.24
The structure of Tier 2 allows for a third strategy. Given that Tier 2 consisted of two distinct
regulatory changes, desulfurization of fuels and changes in vehicle emissions equipment, we can
22The cost estimates also require an assumption about the phase in of the standards. The EPA assumes that
manufacturers meet the requirements by starting with the smaller vehicles and moving to the larger vehicles. If
anything, this will overstate the cost of achieving a given emissions level, as it is not necessarily the cost-minimizing
approach.
23Because Tier 2 does not apply to California, Alaska and Hawaii, the EPA adjusts their numbers to represent
emission levels for the remaining 47 states.
24Recent work by Muller and Mendelsohn (2007) suggests EPA assumptions about marginal damages from PM and
sulfur could be high. Muller and Mendelsohn estimate average marginal damages per ton per year of PM2:5 ranging
from $3,300 to $500 in urban and rural areas, respectively. Average marginal damages from SO2 are estimated to be
$1,500 and $900 per ton per year in large cities and rural areas, respectively.13
calculate the abatement costs assuming that the EPA only implemented the vehicle portion of the
regulations. We refer to this strategy as the ￿separated MAC.￿
Calculating the level of abatement absent desulfurization requires calculating (a) the amount
of the Tier 2 NOx reductions coming from non-Tier 2 vehicles burning desulfurized fuel and (b)
the increase in NOx emissions from Tier 2 vehicles that would occur if these vehicles ran on the
existing fuels. Both require estimates of how emissions change with the sulfur content of the fuel;
the former also requires information on the driving and retirement patterns for non-Tier 2 vehicles.
We use information in the RIA and the MOBILE6 model to estimate the emissions reductions that
would have occurred absent desulfurization.
The RIA provides estimates of the NOx savings associated with shifting non-Tier 2 vehicles to
desulfurized fuel. Given these estimates, we use the EPA￿ s MOBILE6 model of driving patterns and
retirements of existing vehicles to calculate the increase in emissions from assuming the savings from
existing vehicles is zero. These calculations imply that 12.7 percent of the NOx savings associated
with Tier 2 are the result of non-Tier 2 automobiles running on desulfurized fuel. Given the estimate
of the savings from the existing vehicle stock, we calculate how the remaining 87.3 percent would be
a⁄ected. We again use the EPA￿ s estimates of how NOx emissions change with the sulfur content
of fuels; we then apply these to Tier 2 vehicles. The EPA estimates that desulfurization of the fuels
reduces NOx emissions from Tier 2 vehicles by 25.2 percent. Combined these suggest that the NOx
savings under a policy that only altered vehicles emission controls would have been 65.3 percent
absent desulfurization.25
Once the level of abatement is known for our three estimation strategies, we require information
on costs. The RIA explicitly reports both credited and uncredited average cost of NOx abatement,
as well as separating the costs for the vehicle emissions equipment and desulfurization portions of
the regulation. We use this information and additional information in the RIA to subtract out the
assumed markup to generate a total cost for each of the three methods of accounting for sulfur
and PM. Speci￿cally, Table V-53 of the RIA reports the annualized costs separately for the NOx
and sulfur portions of the legislation for the years 2004 to 2024; Table V-51 reports annual costs
for desulfurization for 2004 to 2030. The text of the RIA also reports that the discounted value
25The EPA relies on a variety of assumptions to estimate the NOx reductions from Tier 2. These include: the
phase-in of Tier 2 vehicles, the e¢ cacy of emission systems on existing vehicle stock, driving habits and how sulfur
a⁄ects catalytic converters. In general, our estimates are robust to the assumptions that only a⁄ect existing vehicles
because the NOx savings from existing vehicles are low.
The main parameter of interest for Tier 2 vehicles is how sulfur a⁄ects catalytic converter operation; for the
parameter the EPA does not provide much insight regarding the range of possibilities. Changing this parameter by
ten percent in either direction does not appreciably change our conclusions.14
of total costs associated with the entire legislation are $48.5 billion.26 Using these data, we are
able to change the assumption about markups. Table 5 reports the average costs for each of our
methods. Evident from this is that the method for controlling for sulfur and particulate matter is
very important. Ignoring the reductions in both sulfur and particulate matter implies a marginal
abatement cost of $2040/ton. Using the EPA￿ s values for the sulfur and particulate matter reduces
this cost to $1320/ton;27 subtracting out the assumed markup reduces this further to $1164/lbs.
Treating the vehicle and fuel regulations separately yields much lower average cost estimates.
Allowing for the assumed margin, the average cost is $1108/ton. Removing the margin reduces
this to $896/ton. These results imply that the burden placed on re￿ners was much larger than the
burden placed on automobile manufacturers. This is consistent with the political economy story
that regulatory stringency will be a function of industry concentration. Similar to the electricity
industry, the gasoline re￿ning industry is much less concentrated than the automobile industry.
Furthermore, given the inelastic nature of gasoline demand, much of the desulfurization costs likely
fell onto consumers. Both of these industry features suggest that regulators will face less resistance
when setting regulations on the re￿ning market. This, too, represents an ine¢ ciency; one that we
do not attempt to quantify.
By separating the automobile manufacturer and desulfurization costs, we are able to isolate the
costs incurred by automobile manufacturers and compare them to the costs incurred by electricity
generators. For this reason, our preferred estimates of the costs associated with NOx abatement
from the automobile sector is $896/ton.
The RIA gives us one point on the total/average cost curve, but to calculate the level of
ine¢ ciencies across the two sectors requires a marginal abatement cost schedule for passenger
vehicles. The RIA, states that ￿in the case of our standards, both the emission reductions and the
fuel cost as a function of sulfur content are nearly linear, though the vehicle costs do contain some
nonlinearity￿(page VI-3). If we assume that the nonlinearity in the vehicle costs is minimal, this
implies that total costs are linear in NOx abatement levels, and that marginal costs are constant
and equal to the average cost number reported in Table 5. Insofar as the marginal cost curve is
upward sloping, we will tend to overstate the ine¢ ciencies present. Section 5 presents additional
evidence to help assess the accuracy of the constant marginal cost assumption.
26The report also describes annual costs for NOx in Table V-21(A). If we instead use these, we do not get quite the
same discounted sum compared to subtracting out the sulfur costs from the EPA￿ s reported total; using the vehicle
cost number result in costs that are $2.3 billion lower. To be conservative, we use the higher of the two total NOx
cost numbers.
27These PM credits are the result of reducing non-NOx PM via increases in engine e¢ ciency.15
4.3 E¢ ciency gains from equalizing marginal abatement costs
With our estimates of the marginal abatement costs for the two industries in hand, we can now
make comparisons across programs. More speci￿cally, we estimate the costs of failing to equalize
marginal costs across source types. These costs are best viewed graphically. Figure 5 is a stylized
representation of our calculations. The width of the horizontal axis is the total discounted level
of abatement from both sources (22.1 million tons), with abatement from point sources measured
from left to right and abatement from mobile sources measured from right to left.
Our calculations imply that the existing regulations correspond to point A; the marginal abate-
ment costs of point sources exceed those of mobile sources. We can calculate the potential e¢ ciency
gains by calculating the area of the triangle E. We do this using our alternative methods for ac-
counting for sulfur and particulate matter costs when calculating the marginal abatement cost for
mobile sources. These results are reported Table 5.
Regardless of how we credit for sulfur and PM, we ￿nd that we are over-regulating power plants.
At the high end for the MAC for mobile sources of $1320/ton, we estimate potential e¢ ciency gains
of $600 million. Again for the reasons discussed above, this likely represents a lower bound on the
potential e¢ ciency gains. Our preferred estimate represents a modi￿ed Tier 2 policy focusing only
on emissions control equipment. Under this scenario the MAC for mobile sources is $896/ton
yielding potential e¢ ciency gain of $1.7 billion. To put this number in perspective, the total
compliance costs associated with point sources is $6.1 billion, while the total compliance costs for
mobile sources, absent desulfurization, is $13.75 billion. An ine¢ ciency of $1.7 billion represents
roughly nine percent of the total compliance costs. Accounting for the ine¢ ciency across all three
industries (electricity, re￿ning and automobile) would yield even larger estimates.
5 Additional Evidence on Marginal Abatement Costs
This section presents additional evidence on the accuracy of the cost estimates that we use. Before
doing that, it is useful to consider the advantages and disadvantages of using engineering estimates,
as we do in this paper, as compared to the more traditional approach in the economics literature
which involves developing econometric estimates of the parameters of an underlying cost function.
Although the econometric approach has its advantages, we argue that engineering cost estimates
are more appropriate for our purposes.28
28A number of recent papers utilize engineering estimates of costs to benchmark electricity sector performance.
See, for example, Wolfram (1999), Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) and Joskow and Kahn (2002).16
To execute our analysis, we estimate marginal abatement cost curves for both the electricity and
automotive sectors. To trace out these curves, we have estimated the costs of implementing di⁄erent
abatement options at di⁄erent coal plants and for di⁄erent vehicle classes. An alternative approach
could have involved estimating an econometric model using data describing the observed compliance
decisions that coal plant operators and automotive manufacturers actually made. The advantage
of this alternative approach would be that it accounts for behavioral responses and idiosyncrasies
that cause human decision-makers to deviate from the engineering ideal. Fowlie (2008) provides one
example of such a deviation in the context of NOx pollution abatement technology, as she shows
that ￿rms under traditional regulation were more likely to invest in capital-intensive abatement
technology compared to ￿rms operating in deregulated electricity markets.
On the other hand, barriers to obtaining precise, unbiased econometric estimates favor engi-
neering estimates. This is particularly true in our case where the engineering estimates are based
on known technologies that have already been implemented in the ￿eld. Reliable econometric esti-
mates would be much more di¢ cult to construct using available data. Moreover, because we seek
to estimate abatement cost curves, we need to estimate the costs of technologies that were imple-
mented and costs of abatement technologies that were not implemented. Econometric estimation
of the costs of abatement options that were not chosen would require strong assumptions and would
likely be confounded by selection problems.29
Finally, our paper seeks to assess the e¢ cacy of regulatory coordination. Arguably, this is best
accomplished using cost information that was available to policy makers ex ante. Econometric
estimates would capture unanticipated changes in costs, technology operating characteristics, and
other factors that were not known to the regulators during the policy design process.
In sum, with access to rich and precise engineering cost estimates, we can develop reliable
estimates of an important welfare calculation.
5.1 Power plants
One potential check on the engineering estimates re￿ ected in the aggregate marginal abatement
cost curve for power plants is to compare the prices that have emerged in the market for permits
under the NBP to the prices that are predicted by the engineering estimates we use. Speci￿cally, if
one considers the level of emissions reductions required under the NOx Budget Program, the price
corresponding to this level of emissions reductions on our marginal abatement cost curve is $1920
29Selection issues would arise because plant operators presumably install the technology that is best suited for their
plant, given both observable and unobservable (to the econometrician) factors.17
per ton. By comparison, over the period 2004-2008, permits in the NBP traded at an average price
of $2080 per ton.30
While these numbers are quite close, several caveats are in order. For one, previous work
suggests that ￿rms did not choose the least cost compliance options as suggested by the MAC
curve that we use (Fowlie, 2008). On the other hand, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest the
engineering cost estimates re￿ ected in our marginal abatement cost curve might overstate realized
costs.
5.2 Vehicles
We consider several benchmarks for the vehicle costs. First, as discussed in Section 2.2, the Tier
2 program was the most recent in a series of regulations aimed at reducing NOx emissions from
passenger vehicles. The Tier 1 program, also part of the Clean Air Act Amendments, promulgated
standards ranging from 0.60 grams/mile to 1.53 grams/mile depending on the vehicle weight (com-
pare this to the Tier 2 requirement that ￿ eets achieve an average emissions rate of 0.07 grams/mile).
The Tier 1 standards became e⁄ective in 1991. At the end of the 1990s, the National Low Emis-
sions Vehicle program represented a voluntary agreement between the EPA and the automobile
manufacturers to reduce emissions ahead of Tier 2 by designing cars that achieved the California
Low Emissions Vehicle standards. Under the program, vehicles were required to achieve emissions
rates of 0.2 grams/mile by 2001.
If the technology for reducing NOx has been roughly constant over the 1990s, cost estimates
from these programs can provide several points along the MAC for NOx from vehicles.31 Essentially,
each program brought about incremental reductions in NOx. If the costs of the later programs were
much higher than the earlier programs, this could suggest a steep positively sloped MAC. In fact,
engineering estimates from these two programs suggest that the steps were associated with roughly
the same cost per ton reduced, and if anything were higher than the costs associated with Tier 2.32
While this pattern is consistent with a gently sloped or even constant marginal abatement curve
up to the level of reductions achieved by Tier 2, it does not provide any insight on the costs of
30Permit price data are available from Evolution Markets LLC.
31The three-way catalytic converter has been the primary NOx control technology used in U.S. light-duty vehicles
since the 1980s (MECA 2003).
32The regulatory impact analysis for Tier 1 reports cost e⁄ectiveness estimates of $2000-2750/ton. The RIA for
the NLEV cites a $/ton ￿gure drawn from a report done in 1994 analyzing the costs of extending California￿ s LEV
plan to the states in the ozone transport region. That report cites a ￿gure of $3065/ton, higher than the costs for
either Tier 1 or Tier 2, although the report notes in words that technologies that the 1994 report expected to be
required proved to be unnecessary (US EPA 1997 http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/ld-hwy/lev-nlev/sfrm-ria.pdf).18
requiring reductions beyond Tier 2. Further, if the costs of the NLEV program truly are higher
than the costs of Tier 2, the assumption of constant technology seems dubious, which calls into
question the ability of the earlier programs to say anything about the incremental costs at Tier 2.
To get a sense for the costs of achieving reductions beyond those in Tier 2, we looked for evidence
of steps that could have been taken but were not at the time that the Tier 2 regulations were
adopted.
Our read of the relevant engineering literature suggests that available technology could have
yielded reductions beyond those mandated by Tier 2. For instance, MECA (2003) describes several
important ways in which NOx can be reduced using the conventional three-way catalytic converter
technologies: placing the catalytic converter closer to the exhaust ports (￿close-coupled￿convert-
ers), denser substrates￿ the material which holds the catalyst, changing the process by which the
catalyst is applied to the substrate and the speci￿c mix of catalytic materials. They go on to
describe tests done to several vehicles which demonstrate that using existing technologies, the ve-
hicles could achieve up to 80 percent lower emissions than those required under Tier 2 (see MECA
2003, Figure 13). This is at least suggestive that requiring greater emissions reductions from cars
than was required under Tier 2 would not have involved dramatically di⁄erent technologies, so it
is unlikely that the MAC beyond the Tier 2 reduction levels is steeply sloped.
The second indication that technologies were available to get additional reductions comes from
the fact that di⁄erent vehicles have achieved very di⁄erent emissions rates. Under Tier 2, manu-
facturers were allowed to do ￿ eet averaging. Speci￿cally, each manufacturers￿￿ eet had to achieve
an average emissions level of 0.07 grams/mile, but individual vehicles could be tested up to a level
of 0.14 grams/mile.33 We have obtained data on the dispersion in the emissions rates by vehicle
in 2007, the ￿rst model year for which the full Tier 2 regulations were e⁄ective for the smaller
trucks and cars. Even if all of the vehicles were using the exact same pollution control strategy,
they would likely achieve di⁄erent grams-per-mile emissions rates because of the variations in ve-
hicle fuel e¢ ciency. To address that, we have converted the grams per mile emissions to grams
per gallon using information on vehicles￿fuel e¢ ciencies. The average ratio of emissions rates at
manufacturers￿10th and 90th percentile vehicle was above 10 (see Figure 6). Although we do not
have su¢ cient information to ascribe a particular cost to improving the e¢ ciency of the vehicles
on the right-hand side of Figure 6, the fact that the technology existed to reduce some vehicles￿
emissions to such low levels relative to other vehicles again suggests that the MAC is likely to be
relatively ￿ at for reductions beyond the Tier 2 levels.
33This maximum does not become binding for the large trucks and sport-utility vehicles until 2009. (See Federal
Register Vol. 65, No. 28, pp. 6855-6856, 6858, 6866.).19
6 Relative Bene￿ts from NOx Emissions Reductions
Throughout the preceding analysis, we have assumed that the bene￿ts per ton of NOx emissions
reduction are equal across cars and power plants. In this section, we evaluate the plausibility of this
assumption. A comprehensive comparison of damages per unit of NOx emitted from point versus
mobile sources must account for a variety of factors including the location of the sources, the nature
of chemical processes that form particulates and ambient ozone, and the population densities in
a⁄ected areas. We present results from the regulatory impact analyses that were conducted prior
to the promulgation of both rules. We also review the scienti￿c evidence that has emerged since
these rules were introduced. The section begins with a discussion of damages from exposure to
particulates. We then consider ozone related damages.
6.1 Avoided damages from exposure to particulates
Particulate-related damages from NOx emissions can vary signi￿cantly across NOx emissions sources
due to di⁄erences in chemical reaction rates, transport patterns, and exposure rates. The EPA car-
ried out comprehensive impact assessments for both Tier 2 and the NOx emissions trading program
(U.S. EPA, 1999a; U.S. EPA 1999b). In both assessments, the EPA used a national-scale source-
receptor matrix based on the Climatological Regional Dispersion Model (CRDM) to evaluate the
e⁄ects of the proposed regulations on ambient particulate matter concentrations.34
Both impact assessments provide estimates of e⁄ects on particulate matter concentrations. Tier
2 was projected to reduce average PM2.5 concentrations by 1.8 percent relative to a 2030 basecase.
When weighted by population, the average reductions increases 2 percent (suggesting that a slightly
larger proportion of reductions occur in more densely populated areas). Projected reductions in
PM2.5 concentrations under the NBP are signi￿cantly smaller: average reductions and population
weighted average reductions are 0.04 percent.
Direct comparisons of these estimated emissions reductions are complicated by the fact that
the two analyses were conducted independently and measure impacts relative to di⁄erent base
years, and the signi￿cant di⁄erences in the size and scope of the two programs.35 Comparisons of
34Relative to more sophisticated and resource-intensive three-dimensional modeling approaches, the CRDM and
its associated source-receptor matrix do not fully account for all the complex chemical interactions that take place
in the atmosphere in the secondary formation of PM. In the RIA for Tier 2, analyses were also carried out using a
Regional Particulate Model.
35NOx reductions mandated under Tier 2 are more than three times as large as those mandated under the NBP.
Tier 2 is also larger in scope; PM reductions were achieved directly (via new PM standards) and indirectly (via
reductions in both NOx and SO2):Under the NBP, all PM reductions are due to reductions in NOx precursors.20
the ratio of population weighted average reductions to unweighted reductions across programs are
instructive. These rations are both close to one, suggesting that bene￿ts are similarly distributed
across densely populated and sparsely populated areas in both programs.
A recent case study o⁄ers a more direct ￿apples to apples￿ comparison of relative marginal
damages across source types. Wol⁄ (2000) analyzes formation and dispersion of nitrate particles
for a random sample of coal-￿red power plants and stretches of interstate highway across the
United States. The study estimates the mass of secondary particulate matter inhaled per unit of
emitted NOx and concludes that these estimated intake fractions are not statistically signi￿cantly
di⁄erent across the two source types. In sum, the ￿ndings of this study are consistent with our
assumption that NOx emissions from vehicles regulated under Tier 2 cause similar damages, in
terms of particulate-related damages per unit of NOx reduced, to emissions from large point sources
regulated under the NBP.
6.2 Avoided damages from ground-level ozone exposure
Estimating the e⁄ects of NOx emissions reductions on ozone formation and exposure is more com-
plicated. Ozone is formed by photochemical reactions involving two classes of precursors: volatile
organic compounds (VOCs) and nitrogen oxides. An important feature of ozone chemistry is the
complex and highly nonlinear relationship between precursor concentrations, temperature, and
ozone production.36 Whereas ozone formation increases with NOx emissions in NOx sensitive pho-
tochemical regimes, the rate of ozone formation can decrease with increased NOx emissions when
the ratio of NOx to VOCs is high. The term ￿NOx disbene￿ts￿ refers to the ozone increases that
can result from NOx emission reductions in VOC-constrained areas.37
In ex ante analyses of ozone concentration reductions under Tier 2 and the NBP, the EPA used
a Eulerian three-dimensional grid photochemical air quality model to simulate the physical and
chemical processes in the atmosphere that a⁄ect ozone formation. This detailed modeling approach
explicitly accounts for spatial and temporal variations as well as di⁄erences in the reactivity of
emissions when modeling complex photochemical relationships. The e⁄ects of each program on
average ozone concentrations and seasonal "SUM06" measures (i.e. the cumulative sum of hourly
concentrations over 0.06 ppb that occur during daylight hours in ozone season) were estimated.
36Other factors a⁄ecting ozone production e¢ ciency include water vapor concentrations, vertical mixing rates, and
other meteorological factors
37In areas dominated by NOx, ozone catalysts are removed via the production of nitric acid, which slows ozone
formation. Because NOx is generally depleted more rapidly than VOC, this e⁄ect is usually short-lived, with NOx
ultimately forming ozone further downwind.21
Under Tier 2, the mean seasonal average ozone concentrations across all U.S. population grid
cells decline by an estimated 2 percent relative to a 2030 basecase. A similar decline is predicted
for the population weighted average (suggesting uniform reductions across rural and urban areas).
The projected average SUM06 measure in 2030 falls by 27 percent. The analysis of the NBP,
which reports results for daylight hours only, reports an unweighted average decline in ozone con-
centrations of 1.6 percent across all U.S. population grid cells relative to a 2007 basecase. The
population-weighted average is very similar. The projected SUM06 is reduced by only 3.7 percent.
As in the case of PM, it is di¢ cult to draw conclusions about the relative marginal bene￿ts (in
terms of avoided damages from ozone exposure) per unit of NOx reductions from the RIA results.
However, similar ratios of population weighted and unweighted reductions indicates that bene￿ts
from NOx reductions are similarly distributed across areas with di⁄erent population densities.
There are several reasons why the ozone-related damages per unit of NOx emissions might di⁄er
across source types. First, the NBP sources are distributed di⁄erently in space as compared to the
new vehicles a⁄ected by Tier 2.38 Ozone production e¢ ciency (i.e., the net production of O3
per unit of NOx emissions) can di⁄er signi￿cantly with the location of the source due to variation
in VOC concentrations, temperature, and meteorological conditions. Second, whereas all of the
NOx emissions reductions achieved under the NBP occur during ￿ozone season,￿NOx emissions
reductions from Tier 2 occur year round. Because the photochemical reaction that forms ozone
requires sunlight and heat, NOx emissions occurring in colder months are unlikely to contribute to
ozone problems. This suggests that average bene￿ts per ton of NOx reduced at mobile sources are
smaller as compared to point sources. However, recent studies have found that ozone production
e¢ ciencies are higher in vehicular exhaust versus power plant plumes (Luria et al., 1999; Ryerson et
al., 2003; Sillman, 2007). This could imply that bene￿ts per unit of NOx emissions reduction might
be signi￿cantly higher for Tier 2 versus the NBP. Recent measurements taken in aircraft transects of
emissions plumes and vehicular exhaust document substantial di⁄erences in the rate and magnitude
of ozone production associated with NOx emissions from mobile and point sources. Power plants
are very concentrated point sources of NOx emissions, but they do not emit appreciable amounts of
VOCs. These conditions are not favorable to ozone production.39 Conversely, motor vehicles emit
both VOCs and a more diluted form of NOx. Co-emission typically results in VOC/NOx ratios
that favor immediate ozone production and higher ozone yields (Ryerson et al., 2003b).
38Whereas the coal plants regulated under the NBP are all located in Eastern states (many in rural areas), Tier 2
sources are distributed across all states, except California, Alaska and Hawaii.
39Ozone production e¢ ciency (OPE) measures in power plant plumes tend to be low close to the source, although
ozone concentrations do increase with distance as NOx emissions become less concentrated and mix with external
sources of reactive VOCs.22
The state of knowledge we summarize above is generally supportive of our assumption that
marginal bene￿ts per ton of NOx reduced do not di⁄er signi￿cantly across the Tier 2 and NBP
program. In addition to reviewing the scienti￿c literature relevant to a comparison of impacts of
point versus mobile sources of NOx emissions, we also used the Air Pollution Emissions Experiments
and Policy (APEEP) model to estimate the average monetary value of reduced particulate matter
and ozone formation resulting from incremental reductions in NOx emissions at coal-￿red plants
regulated under the NBP and vehicles regulated under Tier 2, respectively (Muller and Mendelsohn,
2006).40 Because the APEEP model uses a reduced form approximation of ozone photochemistry
(versus photochemical air quality simulations), estimates of the e⁄ects of small changes in NOx
emissions on ozone formation at di⁄erent locations should be interpreted with some caution.41
When this model is used to estimate marginal damages from NOx emissions, the average estimated
damages at NBP sources is very similar to the average of county ground-level damage estimates
(weighted by vehicle miles travelled).42 The APEEP model can be used to generate point estimates,
but not standard errors, which makes it impossible to conduct formal hypothesis testing.
7 Other NOx Programs
The bulk of our analysis focuses on comparing the costs of reducing NOx from passenger vehicles
to the costs of reducing NOx from power plants. As depicted in Figure 1, these two sources account
for less than half of the man-made NOx in the U.S.: passenger, or light-duty, vehicles emitted 18
percent of U.S. NOx in 2002, just before the Tier 2 standards came into e⁄ect, and electric utilities
40We use the APEEP model to estimate the e⁄ects of incremental changes in NOx emissions at regulated sources
on the formation and transport of nitrates. In each simulation, other components of the model are held ￿xed so
that the resulting di⁄erence can be interpreted as the damage (measured in dollars) per ton of NOx emissions at
the selected source. All damages are measured relative to those associated with observed 2002 emissions. Damages
include adverse e⁄ects on human health, reduced yields of agricultural crops and timber, reductions in visibility,
enhanced depreciation of man-made materials, and damages due to lost recreation services.
41The APEEP model uses a linear regression model to estimate ozone concentrations as a function of ambient
concentrations of precursors (i.e., NOx, VOCs, and CO), ambient air temperature, and geography variables. Because
precursor concentrations are highly correlated, it is di¢ cult to obtain a precise estimate of the isolated e⁄ect of
a change in NOx emissions on ozone concentrations, or to simulate the conditions in power plant plumes versus
auto exhaust. Moreover, the model does not include interactions between the precursors, potentially missing some
important dimensions of the ozone formation process, such as the presence of NOx disbene￿ts.
42Mean damages per ton of NOx are $247 (standard deviation $850) for vehicles. To estimate marginal bene￿ts
associated with emissions reductions at coal-￿red power plants, we estimate the value associated with incrementally
changes in NOx emissions at each plant. Mean damages are $277 (standard deviation $578). These estimates are
quite low, in part refelecting the fact that the model uses lower estimates of the value of a statistical life than the
EPA. Another reason is that the APEEP model predicts very large NOx disbene￿ts in urban areas. Whereas the
analysis conducted for the regulatory impact assessments indicated that only a few locations in the center of large
metropolitan areas might experience a slight ozone increase on some days as a consequence of NOx reductions (64
FR 26018), the APEEP model predicts signi￿cant NOx disbene￿ts in 25 percent of counties and at roughly 25 percent
of NBP facilities.23
emitted 23 percent. The remaining emissions come from non-highway mobile sources, such as farm
and construction equipment (20 percent), heavy-duty highway vehicles (19 percent) and industrial
processes and sources (19 percent). Trends in emissions from these ￿ve categories suggest di⁄erent
time paths of emissions reductions. As shown in Figure 7, there have been dramatic improvements
in the emissions of NOx from light-duty vehicles, while the emissions from the other sources have
remained more constant.43
Recently, both heavy-duty highway and non-highway mobile sources have been subject to more
stringent regulations, and the regulatory impact analyses provide engineering estimates of the
relative costs of reducing NOx from these sources. There have been two sets of regulations aimed
at heavy-duty highway vehicles. Regulations promulgated in 1997 and e⁄ective in 2004 required a
number of minor changes to heavy-duty diesel and gasoline trucks, such as injection timing retard.
These changes were estimated to be extremely cost e⁄ective at a range of roughly $100-$300 per ton
including markups. The next set of regulations, enacted in 2000 to be e⁄ective in 2007, required
new technology, such as ￿clean gas induction,￿ 44 selective catalytic reduction, and the development
of new catalysts, and entailed costs per ton that were approximately an order of magnitude higher
than the ￿rst set of regulations.45 These cost estimates are also very close to the cost estimates
for vehicles under Tier 2. Engineers with whom we have spoken contend that achieving reductions
beyond what was required by the 2007 regulations would have involved implementing new and
as yet untested technologies and could involve much higher costs. In light of this, and in light
of the di⁄erence between the 2004 and 2007 regulations, it seems likely that the marginal cost of
abatement is steeply sloped for trucks. Hence, equalizing marginal abatement costs between trucks
and power plants would not obviously lead to e¢ ciency gains as large as the ones we describe for
passenger vehicles.
Non-road diesel vehicles and engines are another story.46 NOx standards for non-road diesel
engines have historically been extremely lax. In 1998, standards were adopted that reduced NOx
43Kahn and Schwartz (2008) also provide evidence suggesting that NOx emissions from vehicles has declined
dramatically.
44Clean gas induction recylces cleaned exhaust gas into the intake. By burning the exhaust twice NOx is reduced.
45The 2007 regulations gave manufacturers the option of ￿ eet averaging. Speci￿cally, either the entire ￿ eet must
meet a standard of 1.1 g/bhp, or half of the ￿ eet can meet a standard of 2.0 g/bhp and the other half 0.2 g/bhp. The
EPA also required manufacturers to determine the technologies that they planned on using for the 2007 standards
by the end of 2003, suggesting a signi￿cant amount of R&D was required by manufacturers.
46The EPA distinguishes on-road diesel engines from non-road by the following four factors: (1) the engine is used
in a piece of motive equipment that propels itself in addition to performing an auxiliary function (such as a bulldozer
grading a construction site); (2) the engine is used in a piece of equipment that is intended to be propelled as it
performs its function (such as a lawnmower); (3) the engine is used in a piece of equipment that is stationary but
portable, such as a generator or compressor; or (4) the engine is used in a piece of motive equipment that propels
itself, but is primarily used for o⁄-road functions.24
and particulate matter by as much as two-thirds for some engines. The EPA calculated the cost of
achieving these reductions for a wide array of engine sizes, ranging from 25 horsepower to over 1000
horsepower. For many of these engines, the legislation simply required using technologies already in
use for on-road vehicles. Using assumptions similar to those for the Tier 2 analysis (their assumed
markup is 29 percent), the EPA calculated the average cost of abatement for six engines sizes. The
average cost of abatement varies across the engine size, but for the largest size (also the largest
polluters), the costs ranged from $10-110 per ton; the average abatement cost for the smaller sizes
are typically below $600 per ton.
There are two reasons to believe these are actually upper bounds. For one, these calculations
do not account for the reduction in particulate matter, which were considerable. Second, many of
the compliance strategies improve the operating e¢ ciency of the engines. Factoring in the reduced
operating costs suggest negative average abatement costs for many engines. While one can view
the negative abatement costs with some skepticism, the improved e¢ ciency certainly reduces the
social abatement costs.
8 Conclusions and Discussion
Large scale, market-based air pollution regulations such as the Acid Rain Program and the NOx
Budget Program have successfully taken advantage of signi￿cant gains from trade among large
industrial sources of pollution. Here, we present evidence to suggest that there is also signi￿cant
potential for e¢ ciency improvements from coordinating abatement activity across mobile and point
source pollution types. We estimate that the total compliance costs incurred are almost 10 percent
(or nearly $2 billion) higher than the minimum costs required to achieve the combined reductions
mandated by these two programs. Although the cost ine¢ ciency is slightly lower in percentage
terms than estimates for intra-sector gains from the adoption of the market-based policies, because
the combined costs of programs across multiple sectors will be larger than the cost of any single
program, the e¢ ciency gains in dollar terms are likely to be higher.
There are a number of reasons to believe our estimates represent a lower bound of the productive
ine¢ ciencies present in regulating NOx. First, there is strong evidence to suggest that other
mobile sources, such as on- and o⁄-road diesel, have lower marginal abatement costs than passenger
vehicles. Second, while we have noted that the desulfurization program imposed on re￿ners was
an ine¢ cient way to reduce NOx (even after crediting for the reduced sulfur from the program),
we do not estimate the gains from scaling it back. Finally, we note that our results are based on25
comparing a market-based program for power plants to a command-and-control standard for motor
vehicles. This makes our estimates of the marginal cost of abating NOx emissions from vehicles
an upper bound on the true marginal cost if a more market-based approach were adopted. For
instance, if regulators were able to pass a ￿NOx tax,￿the market might uncover a number of less
expensive abatement strategies, such as driving less or retiring old vehicles.
These ￿ndings are particularly relevant to the ongoing debate over how to design policies to
address climate change. There is tremendous pressure on regulators to ￿nd ways to keep the
economic costs of achieving proposed greenhouse gas reduction targets to a minimum. In theory,
an economy wide tax or cap-and-trade program should ensure that marginal abatement costs are
equated across all sources. Several of the proposed pieces of climate change legislation would
have point and mobile sources of greenhouse gas emissions regulated under the same market-based
regulatory program.47 Others have argued that the transportation sector, which accounts for 27
percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, should be regulated separately from large point
sources (Farrell and Sperling, 2007). This paper illustrates the potential for ine¢ ciency when
sectors and source types are regulated separately.
47Four bills currently under consideration in the U.S. Senate are set mandatory caps on economy-wide greenhouse
gas emissions and either mandate or recommend a market-based cap-and-trade permit system.26
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A Data Appendix
Unit-level compliance strategy choices
1. EPA Electronic Data Reporting for the Acid Rain Program/subpart H. The EPA col-
lects hourly data from over 900 U.S. power plants who are required by law to install and operate
Continuous Emissions Monitoring Systems (CEMS). All units that are a⁄ected by the Acid Rain
Program, the NOx Budget Trading Program and/or the NOx SIP Call are subject to the monitor-
ing and reporting provisions of Subpart H. Units must report what type of NOx controls they are
operating, installation dates and hours of operation.
2. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Facilities must also report information about
NOx controls annually to the EIA.
3. Institute for Clean Air Companies: Collects information about pollution control retro￿ts
from press releases, annual reports, and other sources.
4. MJ Bradley & Associates: Maintains a comprehensive database containing unit-speci￿c
information regarding pollution control equipment.
Data required to estimate control costs at the unit level
1. U.S. EPA National Electric Energy System (NEEDS): (see above). Includes over 20 unit
level variables, including capacity, heat rate, online year, ￿ring and bottom types. Data are annual;
most recent data are 2000.
2. EPA Electronic Data Reporting for the Acid Rain Program/subpart H: The EPA col-
lects hourly data from over 900 U.S. power plants who are required by law to install and operate
continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS). All the plants in my sample are subject to the
monitoring and reporting provisions of subpart H. This database contains thousands of variables,
most of which are measured hourly at the unit level. Data are available with approximately a six
month lag.
3. U.S. EPA Emissions and Generation Integrated Database (EGRID): EGRID consolidates
available plant level data for all U.S. power plants that are obliged to report data to the U.S.
government. EGRID reports data on an annual level for hundreds of variables at the boiler, plant,
company, parent company and state level. The most recent data are 2000.
4. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Form 767 : Power plants(non-nuclear) larger
than 10MW are required to submit form EIA-767 annually. The forms collect data on plant opera-31
tions and equipment design (including boilers, generators, cooling systems, ￿ ue gas desulfurizations,
￿ ue gas particulate collectors, and stacks). Most recent data are 2002.
5. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Form 860: Power plants(non-nuclear) larger
than 10MW are required to submit form EIA-767 annually. The forms collect generator-speci￿c
information such as initial date of commercial operation, generating capacity, ownership and energy
sources.
6. Platts BaseCase: A comprehensive database covering supply, electric demand, transmis-
sion interfaces, and Platts fuel price forecasts, as well as unit-level hourly data. Compiled from
EIA, FERC, NERC, CEMS, RUS, utility reports, manufacturers￿publications, and Platts sources.
7. Raftelis Financial Consultants Water and Wastewater Rate Survey.
8. Bureau of Labor Statistics: Regional estimates of boilermaker and construction wages.
9. Personal Correspondence: Representatives from the major coal-￿red boiler manufactur-
ers (Alstom Engineering, Babcock Power, Foster Wheeler, Riley Power Inc.) provided valuable
information about the technical speci￿cations of the boilers in the sample De-NOx Technologies
LLC provided data on reagent and reagent transportation costs. Other technical assistance was
provided by Cichanowicz Consulting Engineers LLP.
Permit Price/Transaction Data
1. Evolution Markets LLC
Estimates of anticipated post-retro￿t NOx emissions rates (conditional on boiler
characteristics) constructed using the following sources:
1. Biewald, B., J. Cavicchi, T. Woolf and D. Allen. 2000. ￿Use of Selective Catalytic Reduction
for control of NOx Emissions from Power Plants in the U.S.￿Synapse Energy Economics Inc.
2. Cichanowicz, J.E. 2004. ￿Why are SCR costs still rising?￿ . Air Quality Control, 148( 3): 32.
3. Electric Policy Research Institute. 1999. ￿Application of Methodology for Identi￿cation of
Least Cost NOx Control Combinations.￿
4. Electric Policy Research Institute. 1999. UMBRELLA: ￿Software for Assessing NOx Control
Technology Combinations, Version 1.0.￿
5. Farzan, H. G.J. Maringo, D.W. Johnson, D.K. Wong . 1999.￿B&W￿ s Advances on Cyclone
NOx Control via Fuel and Air Staging Technologies￿ , EPRI_DOE_EPA Combined Utility
Air Pollutant Control Symposium, Atlanta GA.32
6. Staudt, J. ￿Technologies and Cost E⁄ectiveness of Post-Combustion NOx Controls.￿Andover
Technology Partners, http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/proceedings/99/99scr-sncr/staudt.pdf.
7. Steitz, T.H., R.W. Cole. 1999. ￿Field Experience in Over 30,000 MW of Wall Fired Low
NOx Installations.￿Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation.
8. U.S. Department of Energy. 2002.￿Full-Scale Demonstration of Low-NOx Cell Burner Retro-
￿t.￿http://www.netl.doe.gov/cctc/summaries/clbrn/cellburnerdemo.html.
9. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2002. Documentation Supplement for EPA Modeling
Applications (V.2.1) Using the Integrated Planning Model. O¢ ce of Air and Radiation.
Washington D.C.
10. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1999. Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final
Section 126 Petition Rule, O¢ ce of Air and Radiation, Washington DC.
11. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1998. Regulatory Impact Analysis for the NOx SIP
Call, O¢ ce of Air and Radiation, Washington DC.
12. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1998, Feasibility of Installing NOx Control Technolo-
gies by May 2003, O¢ ce of Atmospheric Programs, Acid Rain Division, Research Triangle
Park, NC.
13. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1998. Regulatory Impact Analysis for the NOx SIP
Call, FIP and Section 128 Petitions, O¢ ce of Air Quality Planning and Standards, O¢ ce of
Atmospheric Programs, Washington D.C.
14. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1998. Analyzing Electric Power Generation under
the CAAA. O¢ ce of Air and Radiation. Washington D.C.33










Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The unit of analysis is a generating unit or boiler.34
B Tables and Figures
B.1 Tables
Table 1: Costs and Emissions Reductions for a Representative Unit
j cj Rj MACj
($ 000￿ s) (tons NOx) ($/ton)
0 0 0 ￿
1 6,996 5,361 ￿
2 6,078 6,177 ￿
3 4,864 6,730 723
4 10,102 8,100 ￿
5 12,854 9,470 ￿
6 11,885 10,865 1,698
7 40,956 19,238 3,472
8 51,533 19,333 112,116
Source: EPRI￿ s UMBRELLA software.
See Data Appendix.
Table 2: Variable Costs Associated with Tier 2 ($ per vehicle)
LDV LDT 1 LDT 2 LDT 3 LDT 4/MDPV
4 Cylinder 24.99 13.16 8.16 N/A N/A
6 Cylinder 65.16 91.46 90.98 238.86 N/A
8 Cylinder 75.42 N/A 70.97 171.99 171.99
Larger 8/10 Cylinder N/A N/A N/A N/A 291.54
Sales Weighted 44.69 39.87 84.27 178.74 187.53
Notes: LDV = Light Duty Vehicles, LDT = Light Duty Trucks,
MDPV = Medium Duty Personal Vehicle (i.e., vehicles in excess of 8,500 lbs.)
Source: EPA (1999a) Table V-2.35
Table 3: Variable, Fixed, Markup and Learning Costs ($ per vehicle)
LDV LDT 1 LDT 2 LDT 3 LDT 4/MDPV
First and Second Year 82.43 73.80 129.54 248.92 267.57
3rd Year: Learning begins 75.22 68.50 119.90 222.60 233.52
6th Year: Fixed Costs Expire 53.19 49.03 100.64 202.99 212.34
Source: Authors calculations using data from EPA (1999a).
Table 4: Emissions and Savings due to Tier 2 Vehicles in the 47 A⁄ected States
Contribution by Vehicle Class
Year Light Duty Emissions (tons) LDV LDT1/2 LDT 3/4 Savings (tons)
2000 3,548,883 52.1% 30.0% 17.9% ￿
2004 3,612,395 43.5% 37.1% 19.4% 326,556
2007 3,681,990 37.3% 41.0% 21.7% 959,512
2010 3,817,070 33.0% 42.7% 24.3% 1,554,442
2015 4,116,074 28.6% 44.3% 27.1% 2,527,309
2020 4,502,761 26.9% 45.2% 27.8% 3,205,571
2030 5,323,860 27.1% 45.5% 27.4% 4,049,687
Source: EPA (1999a) Table III.A-1.
Table 5: Average Costs Associated with Tier 2 and Potential E¢ ciency Gains
Average/Marginal Cost
Method for dealing with other emissions ($/ton of NOx+NMHC) Ine¢ ciency
Uncredited MAC 2040 ￿
Credited MAC* 1320 $600 million
Credited MAC*, w/ a zero markup 1164 $900 million
Separated MAC 1108 $1.1 billion
Separated MAC, w/ a zero markup 896 $1.7 billion
*Assumes $10,000/ton for PM (a total credit of $3.5 billion) and $4,800/ton for
Sulfur (a total credit of $13.8 billion) 
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B.2   Figures   
Figure 1: NOx Emissions by Source, 2002 
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Figure 3: NOx Control Costs for a Representative Unit 
 














Source: Authors’ calculations.  See text for details.  
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Grams of Nitrogen Oxide Emissions Per Gallon of Fuel
 
Source: Data on miles per gallon from http://www.epa.gov/otaq/tcldata.htm.  Data on grams of NOx per 
mile from http://www.epa.gov/otaq/crttst.htm.  In both cases, we use data on 2007 model-year cars.  
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Electric Utility Combustion Highway Mobile Sources - LD Non Highway  Mobile Sources
Highway Mobile Sources - HD Industrial Sources  
Source: National Emission Inventory (NEI) Air Pollutant Emissions Trends, 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/trends/ 